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ABSTRACT
This study uses cash flow information to examine the validity of
the informational signalling hypothesis and the optimal capital struc-
ture hypothesis concerning the type of securities offered, given that
the companies decide to seek external financing. Earlier empirical
studies used financial ratios and data to interpret the choice of
securities offered. An objective of this study is to extend these
earlier studies by using relative cash flow components to classify and
predict the type of securities issued in an offering. Several
hypotheses are developed to test empirically the cash flow character-
istics of companies that issued straight debt, convertible bonds or
common stock. The results of the cash flow based tests support the
informational signalling hypothesis, but do not support the optimal
capital structure hypothesis. Thus the cash flow information supports
the hypothesis that companies offering equity securities are less
financially healthy than those offering straight debt.
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I. Introduction
The study of security offerings by publicly held companies has
made significant contributions to the financial economics literature.
A number of empirical studies have examined the valuation impact of
different types of security offering announcements on common stocks.
These studies found that companies offering common stocks and con-
vertible bonds experience significant negative abnormal stock returns
around announcement dates. However, the straight debt offering
announcements have no significant economic impact on the value of
respective common stocks. The informational signalling hypothesis
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shows promise of explaining these empirical regularities. According
to the informational signalling hypothesis, security offering deci-
sions are interpreted as signalling devices used by insiders to convey
their superior information to the market concerning the value and
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earnings prospect of the firms. In particular, signalling models
show that the market interprets equity (debt) security offerings as
bad (good) signals of the companies. The empirical findings indicate
the more junior the security offered, the more negative the perception
of the company by investors. These findings are consistent with the
general implication of the signalling models discussed above.
There are only a few studies that have used financial data to
examine the choice of the securities offered. The early works of
Baxter and Cragg [1970], Martin and Scott [1974] and Taub [1975]
focused on the choice of securities offered. In general, they found
that companies offering equities are relatively highly levered and
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smaller in size. They also found that companies offered equities
when the P/E ratios for their stocks were high.
Marsh [1982] used logit analysis to examine the equity and debt
offering choice of U.K. companies. He found companies offer equity
(debt) when there was a favorable stock (bond) market. Additionally,
Marsh concluded that companies behave as if they have a target capital
structure in mind. Recently, Billingsley, Lamy and Thompson (BLT)
[1988] extended Marsh's study with U.S. data to examine the choice
among debt, equity and convertible bond offerings. BLT's major
finding was that companies offering convertible bond have financial
characteristics more in common with companies offering common stock
than those offering straight debt. The Marsh and BLT studies used
financial and stock return data of companies offering securities and
their results were consistent with the optimal capital structure
hypothesis. However, these findings were also consistent with the
implications of the informational signalling hypothesis. Thus, in
explaining security offering decisions of companies, these studies
could not discriminate between the informational signalling hypothesis
and the optimal capital structure hypothesis.
The objective of this study is to extend these earlier empirical
studies by using cash flow information to evaluate the choice of
securities offered by companies. The cash flow information is used
to examine the validity of the informational signalling hypothesis and
the optimal capital structure hypothesis concerning the types of
securities offered. This study examines the cash flow characteristics
of companies offering securities prior to their offering decisions.
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Relative cash flow components are used to classify and predict the
type of securities offered. This study differs from the previous
studies by using complete balance sheet and income statement data of
the offering companies; it uses cash flow components developed by
Gentry, Newbold and Whitford (GNW) [1985a, 1985b], which means the
choice of exogenous variables are not sample dependent; finally, the
study examines the trend of the cash flow characteristics of companies
offering securities. Part II presents the cash flow model and other
financial variables and Part III develops the hypotheses. The data
and methodologies are found in Part IV and the empirical results are
in Part V. The summary and conclusions are in Part VI.
II. Empirical Specification
The Modified Cash Flow Model
The Helfert [1982] cash flow model was modified by Gentry, Newbold
and Whitford (GNW) [1985a, 1985b] and has twelve major components. The
twelve cash flow components (CFC) are net operating (NOF), A receiv-
ables (AARF), A inventories (AINVF), A other current assets (AOCAF),
A payables, (AAPF), A other current liabilities (AOCLF), A net financ-
ing (ANFF), fixed coverage expenses (FCE), net investment (NIF), divi-
dends (DIV), A other asset and liability flows (AOA&L) and the change
in cash and marketable securities (ACash). A cash inflow has a posi-
tive sign and a payment has a negative sign. The algebraic sum of the
components is equal to the change in cash and marketable securities.
The following equation presents a formulation of the modified cash
flow model.
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NOF + AARF + AINVF + AOCAF + AAPF + AOCLF + ANFF
+ FCE + NIF + DIV + AOA&L - ACash =0 (1)
In order to avoid the overidentif ication problem, the ACash component
is omitted.
The accounting convention underlying the cash flow statement re-
sults in total net cash inflow (TCI) being equal to the absolute value
of total net cash outflow (TCO). We have simplified the notation by
substituting the expression total net cash flow (TCF) for TCI and TCO,
i.e., TCF = TCI = TCO. By dividing each absolute cash flow component
by TCF, CFC/TCF, a relative cash flow component (CFC*) is created.
The CFC* represents the percentage each component contributes to the
firm's total net cash inflow or outflow. The CFC*s are useful in
evaluating a firm's financial health. By establishing a hierarchy of
the CFC*, the availability of free operating cash flow can be used to
assess the trend of a firm's financial strengths and weaknesses. The
cash flow model has been successful in the prediction of bankruptcy,
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bond ratings and loan risk. The hypotheses developed for the study
are based on the concept of relative free cash flow components (FCF*).
An example of the hierarchy of the CFC* and the FCF* is presented
in Table 1. Table 1 shows Company A has 100 percent of its cash in-
flows originating from operations. After subtracting the basic
outflows for capital investment (40%), dividends (10%), fixed coverage
expenditures (5%) and working capital (10%), the FCF* from operations
after working capital is 35 percent. In contrast Company D has 25
percent of its cash inflows coming from operations. After deducting
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the cash outflows for investment (20%) and fixed coverage expenditures
(30%), Company D has a FCF* after working capital of a -25 percent.
Because the financial health of Company A is substantially better than
Company D, it has internal cash flow available for retiring any long-
or short-term source of financing or investing in marketable securities.
In contrast, Company D has negative internal cash flow and must seek
external financing or sell marketable securities to offset the short-
fall in FCF* after working capital.
Table 1 illustrates several basic concepts related to FCF* and
financial health of a company. First, as the percentage of cash inflow
coming from net operations declines, there is a decline in FCF* before
and after working capital. Under these conditions the firm is likely
to seek external financing. Second, as the FCF* before and after work-
ing capital declines, the financial health of the firm deteriorates
and the riskiness of the firm increases. Alternatively, the example
shows the higher the FCF* the lower the risk. Third, as the relative
cash inflow from operations (NOF*) decreases from Company A to Company
D, the relative cash outflow to investment (NIF*) decreases and the
relative cash outflow for fixed coverage expenditures (FCE*) increases.
In each of these scenarios there is an increase in risk.
The GNW cash flow model is further modified in order to examine
the implications of the informational signalling hypothesis and the
optimal capital structure hypothesis. The modification relates to the
change in net financial flow (ANFF) component, where the ANFF is sub-
divided into three parts: A short term borrowing (ASTB), A debt
financing (AFIND) and A equity financing (AFINE) components. With the
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modif ication, there are thirteen (13) relative cash flow components
(CFC*) used to test the hypotheses.
III. Hypotheses
Informational Signalling Hypothesis
A primary objective of this paper is to use cash flow information
to extend the interpretation of the information signalling hypothesis
and the optimal capital structure hypothesis on security offering
decisions of publicly-held companies. The study determines if the
types of securities offered by companies are associated with their
cash flow performance. The following hypotheses are used to focus the
empirical examination.
It is hypothesized that there is a negative relationship between
the size of total cash inflow coming from operations (NOF*) and the
seniority of the securities offered. That is . . .
Hypothesis 1 : Companies offering more junior securities have
a smaller and decreasing fraction of their total
cash inflows coming from operations (NOF*).
Hypothesis 1 indicates that the declining proportion of cash
inflows coming from operations (NOF*), such as Companies B, C and D
in Table 1 , is a result of a decrease in sales, an increase in oper-
ating costs or a combination of declining demand and increasing
operating costs. These events indicate potential profitability and
inefficient asset management problems of a financially unhealthy
company. In an informational asymmetric framework, Myers and Maj luf
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[1984] showed that firms, such as Company A, using internal financing
to cover cash outflow are preferred to firms that use external
financing. According to their model, the market interprets the not-
to-issue decision as a positive signal about the company and the
equity offering decision as a negative signal. Furthermore, when
there is a need for external financing, companies offering debt
securities are interpreted by the market as better than those offer-
ing equity securities. Given this kind of market perception, a
financially healthy company, which has a larger share of its cash
inflow coming from operations, would distinguish itself from the less
healthy ones by offering debt securities when it needs external
financing. Besides, firms like Company A are more likely to choose
debt when offering securities because they can sustain a higher debt
level and justify the increase in bankruptcy risk, Ross [1977]. Thus,
it is hypothesized that companies offering convertible bonds and/or
common stocks have a smaller proportion of their cash inflows coming
from operations than companies offering straight bonds.
In turn, a relatively small percentage of total cash inflow coming
from NOF* results in a reduction in the availability of internally
generated cash for capital investment expenditures (NIF*) and divi-
dends (DIV*). As shown in Table 1, relatively low NOF*, NIF* and DIV*
results in greater financial risk.
Companies that have more value creating investment opportunities
are more profitable and so healthier financially. These companies
will have a larger share of their cash outflow going to capital
investment expenditure (NIF*). Thus, it is hypothesized that there
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is a positive relationship between the share of total cash outflow
going to net investment (NIF*) and the seniority of the securities
offered. As dividends are interpreted as positive signals about the
value and future earnings prospect of the company, the larger the
share of cash outflow going to dividend payments and the more healthy
the company. Thus, it is hypothesized that there is a positive
relationship between the dividends (DIV*) and the seniority of the
securities offered. That is . . .
Hypothesis 2 : Companies offering more junior securities have a
smaller and decreasing proportion of their total
cash outflows going to net investment (NIF*).
Hypothes is 3: Companies offering more junior securities have a
smaller and decreasing proportion of their total
cash outflows going to dividends (DIV*).
The thrust of these two hypotheses is that companies offering con-
vertible bonds and/or common stocks have a smaller proportion of
their total cash outflow going to NIF* and DIV* than companies that
offer straight debt. Alternatively, these hypotheses presume the
financial markets perceive companies offering straight debt as having
the potential to generate the future NOF* that is required to meet
their investment, dividend and debt servicing obligations.
It is hypothesized that companies with an increasing trend of
deferred income taxes and/or a decreasing trend of other assets are
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experiencing a growth in operating cash inflows or cash outflows going
to investment, or vice versa. Thus, it is proposed that . . .
Hypothesis 4 ; There is a positive relationship between net other
asset and liability flow (NOA&L*) and the senior-
ity of the security type.
When a company's NOF* is low or has been declining, a larger and
increasing function of its cash inflow comes from external financing
(ANFF). Another set of hypotheses follow from the preceding observa-
tion. That is . . .
Hypothesis 5 : Companies that offer more junior securities have a
larger and increasing fraction of their cash inflow
coming from external financing (ANFF*).
It is not only important to determine that the ANFF* is relatively
larger for companies offering junior securities, but it is funda-
mental to show that the external capital raised was in the form of
common stock. Thus . . .
Hypothesis 6 : Companies that offer more junior securities have
a larger proportion of their external financing
(ANFF*) coming from equity securities (AFINE*) and
a smaller proportion coming from short term
borrowing (ASTB*) and long term debt (AFIND*).
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The smaller the proportion of net cash inflow coming from outside
borrowing, the smaller the financial risk. However, if it is neces-
sary to seek external financing, the source of the inflow makes a dif-
ference in discriminating between strong and weak companies. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, the general implication of the sig-
nalling model is that the market interprets, among different
alternatives of external financing, riskless debt borrowing as the
least negative signal, while common stock offering as the most nega-
tive signal of the company. Given this interpretation, when companies
have to seek external financing, the healthier ones prefer debt to
equity financing. Within the debt financing, they prefer short-terra
riskless borrowing to long-terra risky debt offering. The signalling
literature indicates that companies do not issue equity securities
unless there are no other choices or their common stock is overpriced
in the market. It is expected that companies offering debt securities
will have a larger proportion of short term borrowing (ASTB*) or long
terra debt (AFIND*), and a smaller share in equity (AFINE*). Thus, it
is proposed that there is a positive relationship between the
seniority of the security to be offered and the short term borrowing
flow (ASTB*) and the debt financing flow (AFIND*) components, but a
negative relationship with the equity financing flow (AFINE*) com-
ponent.
The informational signalling hypothesis does not have direct
empirical implications on the remaining cash flow components. The
predicted signs of the coefficients for the tests of the informational
signalling hypothesis are presented in Table 2.
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Optimal Capital Structure Hypothesis
The optimal capital structure hypothesis is based on the concept
that there exists a target debt level for each firm. It is hypothe-
sized that companies attempt to maintain or retain a target debt
level through their security offerings. Because security offerings
are lumpy, companies deviate from their target level after each
offering. In managing the target debt level, companies tend to
reverse the security type vis-a-vis the last offering, which is the
basis of the following hypothesis. Thus, companies that recently
offered debt securities choose to offer equity securities at the next
offering, and vice versa. It is hypothesized that . . .
Hypothesis 7 : Companies that offer more junior securities have
a smaller share of their external financing coming
from equity securities (AFINE*) and a larger share
coming from short-terra borrowing (ASTB*) and long-
terra debt (AFIND*).
The payment of interest and leasing expenses has a direct affect
on the target debt level. The optimal capital structure hypothesis
assumes the higher the proportion of the total outflow going to fixed
coverage expenditures (FCE*) the greater the chance that a company
will offer equity, or vice versa. Thus . . .
Hypothesis 8 : There is a negative relationship between the FCE*
and the seniority of the security type offered.
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There are three other variables that are directly or indirectly
related to the optimal capital structure hypothesis. They are the
deviation of the debt ratio from its target level (DEVLTD) variable,
a size (SIZE) variable and the asset composition (ASCOMP) variable.
A premise of the optimal capital structure hypothesis is that
companies operate with a target debt ratio (long term debt/total
capital) and they tend to maintain it. Occasionally, the debt ratio
deviates from the firm's target level as a result of changes in re-
tained earnings and lumpy security offerings. In this study the proxy
for the target ratio is the five year historical average of the debt
ratio immediately preceding the year of the offering. The DEVLTD
variable is the deviation of the debt ratio at the beginning of the
offering year from its historical average. For example, when the debt
ratio increases above the target level, the optimal capital structure
infers the firm issues equity securities in order to return to the
target level, or vice versa. Thus, it is hypothesized that a firm
experiencing substantial increase above its target debt level will
tend to issue equity securities, and vice versa. It is proposed
that . . .
Hypo thesi s 9: There is a positive relationship between the
DEVLTD variable and the security type of offering.
Marsh [1982] developed the SIZE and ASCOMP variables as proxies
for determining the target capital structure of offering companies.
The SIZE variable is defined as the logarithm of the market equity
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value of the offering company. The ASCOMP variable is defined as Che
ratio of fixed-to-total assets (both net of depreciation). Both
variables are measured at the beginning of the offering year. Larger
companies are more likely to issue debt securities than smaller com-
panies because of an economy of scale effect in issuing costs. In
addition, the U.S. bond market is more receptive to larger companies.
Companies tend to fund permanent assets with long term financial
instruments, therefore, it is expected that companies with a larger
fixed-to-total assets ratio will utilize more debt. Alternatively,
companies offering more junior securities are smaller in size and
utilizes less fixed assets. It is proposed that . . .
Hypothesis 10 : There is a negative relationship between the SIZE
and ASCOMP variables with the security type of
offering.
The predicted signs of the coefficients for the two hypotheses are
found in Table 2.
IV. Data and Methodologies
Common stocks, convertible bonds and straight debt offerings by
industrial companies over the ten year period from 1977 to 1986 were
identified from the Invest me nt Dealers ' Digest and the Wall St reet
Journal Index . The offerings were included in the study if they met
the following requirements:
1. The companies were listed on the AMEX or NYSE at the time of
the offerings.
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2. The offerings are publicly underwritten and registered with
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) under the tradi-
tional method.
3. The offerings are not for swapping other securities nor for
the explicit purposes of acquisitions and restructuring.
4. The offerings are primary or combinations of primary and
secondary offerings.
5. The companies have only one class of voting common stock.
6. The offering announcements are reported in the Wall Street
Journal (WSJ).
7. The offering announcements are not contaminated by other
company specific announcements such as mergers, takeovers or
organizational changes within a calendar week of the announce-
ment date.
Based on the above criteria, 540 companies were identified as
having offered securities over the ten year horizon. Complete finan-
cial information was available on the COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual tape
for 247 companies during the study period. The time period used in
the study started five years prior to the offering year and ended one
year after the offering year. Among the 247 companies, 104 offered
straight debt, 37 offered convertible bonds and 106 offered common
stocks. Table 3 presents the distribution of the offering companies
by calendar year and the number of industries represented for each of
the three types of security offered. The information in Table 3 sug-
gests that industrial companies tend to offer securities during bull
markets, e.g., the years of 1983, 1985 and 1986. This observation is
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consistent with the Myers and Majluf [1984] adverse selection model.
In addition, all subsamples were well represented by different
industries.
A three part study is used to examine the validity of the infor-
mational signalling hypothesis and the optimal capital structure
hypothesis in security offering decisions. Additionally the effec-
tiveness of cash flow components in predicting the type of security
offered is examined. First, the Duncan's Multiple Range test and the
F test are used to test the equality of each financial variable at the
beginning of the offering year across security types. Next, a
series of student t tests are used to determine if there was a change
in the mean of each financial variable over time. It is achieved by
testing the difference between the mean of each variable measured at
the beginning of the offering year and the mean of the four year
historical average of the variable up to the beginning of the year
preceding the offering for each security type. Lastly, the n-
chotoraous multivariate probit model developed by McKelvey and Zavonis
[1975] is utilized to examine the classification and predictive abil-
ity of the financial variables in security offering decisions. In
order to test the predictive ability of the model, the master sample
in this study is subdivided into an original sample and a holdout
sample. In order to have the two subsamples share similar distribu-
tion of security type and economic conditions, the holdout sample con-
sists of offerings in the years of 1981 and 1985. The offerings in
the other eight years are included in the original sample. As a
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result, the original sample has 80 straight debt offerings, 28 conver-
tible bond offerings and 83 common stock offerings. The holdout
sample has 24 straight debt offerings, 9 convertible bond offerings
and 23 common stock offerings. In the probit analysis, the dependent
variable is the dummy variable for the security type in the offerings.
The dummy variable takes the value of 1 for straight debt offerings,
and the values of 2 and 3 for convertible bond and common stock
offerings, respectively.
V. Empirical Results
The empirical results are divided into two major sections. The
first section is composed of the findings based on cross sectional
analysis as well as time series data. The results represent a differ-
ence between the means test for the financial variables associated
with the three types of securities. The cross sectional test includes
the F statistic results from the analysis of variance tests and
Duncan's Multiple Range test. The time series section presents the
student t test results. The second section presents the findings of
the multivariate polychotomous probit model.
Cross Sectional Analysis
Table 4 presents the results of the F statistics generated by the
analysis of variance tests. The null hypotheses that companies offer-
ing different types of securities have the same financial character-
istics are rejected at the 5% level of significance for five variables.
These five hypotheses and the respective variables are: 1-NOF, 3-DIV,
6-FINE, 11-SIZE and 1L-ASC0MP. Contrary to Hypothesis 9, that is
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related to the optimal capital structure hypothesis, there is no
significant difference in the DEVLTD variable for companies offering
different types of securities.
Because the analysis of variance test does not give the direction
of the differences among the various groups, the Duncan's Multiple
Range test are also presented in Table 4. Four of the five variables
that were significant in the ANOVA tests are also significant at the
.05 level. For the three CFC*s, the findings are consistent with the
implications of the informational signalling hypothesis. In par-
ticular, companies that offer equity securities have a smaller propor-
tion of their cash inflow coming from operations (NOF*), and a larger
proportion coming from A external equity financing (AFINE*).
Companies that offer equity securities have a smaller percentage of
the total outflow going to Investment (NIF*) and dividend payments
(DIV*). In addition, companies offering straight debt have a larger
share of their cash inflow coming from short term borrowing (ASTB*).
Contrary to Hypothesis 7, which is associated with optimal capital
structure hypothesis, companies that offer debt (equity) securities
have more external debt (equity) financing in the preceding year
rather than reversing their financing pattern in order to regain the
target level. In addition, there is no significant difference in
terms of the cash flow going to fixed coverage expenses (FCE*), which
is Hypothesis 8.
Table 4 shows the optimal capital structure hypothesis is weakly
supported by the other variables. First, as seen in the F test,
companies offering different types of securities experience similar
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deviations in their debt ratios from the target level. The supportive
findings come from the proxy variables for the target debt level.
For companies offering debt securities, Table 4 indicates they are
larger in size and have more fixed assets in their asset composition.
However, these observations do not prove the optimal capital struc-
ture hypothesis. The U.S. bond market is more receptive to larger
companies, therefore, it is not surprising that the likelihood of
issuing debt increases with the size of the company, because the
issuing cost is lower for debt issue. Furthermore, permanent assets
grow with the size of a company. Thus, it is not surprising that
the companies offering debt have more fixed assets in their total
asset compositions than companies offering convertible bonds or
common stock.
Time Series Anal y sis
The recent cash flow performance is compared to a four year aver-
age for each set of companies that issued straight debt (SD), con-
vertible bonds (CB) and common stock (CS). These comparisons are
presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7 for SB, CB and CS, respectively. In
the convertible bond group, Table 6, none of the variables experienced
significant change throughout the four years, therefore, the discus-
sion focuses on the straight debt and common stock groups. For the
specific implication of the informational signalling hypothesis that
debt offerings provide positive signals while equity offerings carry
negative signals, the findings of these t tests are mixed. For the
general implication of the information signalling hypothesis that debt
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offerings are not as bad a signal as equity offerings, the findings
are supportive.
Tables 5 and 7 show companies that offer straight debt and common
stock experience a significant decrease in net operating cash flow
(NOF*) over time. The magnitude of the NOF* decrease is much larger
for companies offering common stock. On the other hand, companies in
both groups increased their reliance on external financing (ANFF*) for
cash inflow. At the bottom of Table 5, the results show companies
offering straight debt increasingly rely on external debt financing
(AFIND*) as a source of cash inflow. Besides, the results in Table 7
show that companies offering common stocks increasingly rely on ex-
ternal equity financing (AFINE*) as a source of cash inflow. These
observations contradict a basic assumption of the optimal capital
structure hypothesis that firms attempt to maintain a balanced capital
structure by alternating the type of securities offered. Current DIV*
were significantly smaller than the four year average DIV* for
companies offering straight debt and common stock, Tables 5 and 7,
respectively. However, the size of decrease in outflow going to
dividends (DIV*) is markedly lower for the companies offering common
stock, than for the companies that issued straight debt, which is
supportive of the informational signalling Hypothesis 3. Although the
difference between the current and the average outflow going to
investment (NIF*) is not statistically significant, the size of in-
crease in outflow going to investment (NIF*) for companies offering
straight debt is substantially larger than for companies offering
common stock, which is supportive of signalling Hypothesis 2. The
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change in cash outflow going to fixed coverage expenses (FCE*) for the
two groups of companies contradicts the optimal capital structure
hypothesis presented in Hypothesis 9. Finally, the significant
increase in short terra borrowing (ASTB*) as a source of cash inflow
for companies offering straight debt over time, as shown in Table 5,
is consistent with the implications of the informational signalling
hypothesis. In summary, the findings of the t tests are not con-
sistent with the optimal capital structure hypothesis, but they are
supportive of the informational signalling hypothesis.
Multivariate N-Probit Model-Combined Test
The probit analysis is a combined test of all three security type
groups, plus a series of three pair-wise comparisons. The model is
constructed such that the more junior security group takes on a larger
value for the dependent variable. Each analysis estimates the proba-
bility that the more junior security will occur. Tables 8 and 9 pre-
sent the results of the modified cash flow model with and without the
three financial variables, respectively.
The findings presented in Table 8 provide support to the informa-
tional signalling hypothesis. The significant coefficient estimates
for AFINE* and DIV* indicate that companies offering more junior
securities are more heavily reliant on external equity financing, but
commit less to dividend payments. These are signs of a less healthy
company. The findings presented in Table 9 give even stronger support
to the informational signalling hypothesis. The significant coef-
ficient estimates for the ASTB*, AFINE*, NIF* and DIV* variables give
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further insight that companies offering more junior securities are
spending less on investment expenditure and have less cash inflows
generated from short term borrowing. The shortage of investment op-
portunities is also a sign of a less healthy company. The optimal
capital structure hypothesis is not supported by the test results in
Tables 8 and 9. The DEVLTD, AFIND* and FCE* variables fail to have a
significant coefficient estimate. In addition, the AF1NE* variable is
significant but with the wrong sign for its coefficient. Although the
SIZE and ASCOMP variables are significant with correct sign for their
coefficients, they are not necessarily a result of an optimal capital
structure. Rather the results might be due to the institutional fac-
tors discussed in the previous section. However, the findings on the
SIZE and ASCOMP variables are consistent with those in previous
studies.
The modified cash flow model was modestly accurate in classifying
and predicting the corporate choice of straight debt and common stock
offerings. For the extended model, 79% of the companies offering
straight debt (SD) and 72% offering common stock (CS) were classified
correctly, as shown in Table 8. None of the 28 companies offering
convertible bonds were properly classified, but 22 of them were mis-
classified as common stock offerings.
. Table 8 indicates the predic-
tion results for companies offering straight debt and common stock
were accurate in 79% and 61% of the tests, respectively. Similarly,
no convertible bond offerings were correctly predicted, but two-thirds
of them were incorrectly predicted to be common stock offerings. The
results of the modified cash flow model are presented in Table 9.
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Both the classification and prediction performance are inferior to
the extended model. The classification and prediction accuracies for
straight debt offerings were 74% and 75%, respectively, and 64% and
48%, respectively, for common stock offerings.
Pair-Wise Tests
The findings in a pair-wise comparison test that involved straight
debt offerings were similar to those in the preceding combined test.
In a pairwise comparison of straight debt to common stock offerings
that use the extended model, Table 10 shows the same set of five
variables (SIZE, ASCOMP, ANOA&L*, AFINE* AND DIV*) were significant
and with the same signs as those in the combined test. The modified
cash flow model results in Table 11 show there were three additional
significant cash flow variables, ASTB*, NIF* and FCE*. The sign of
the coefficient estimate for FCE* is contradictory to the implications
of the optimal capital structure hypothesis, but is consistent with
the informational signalling hypothesis. Table 11 indicates that com-
panies offering straight debt have more cash inflow from short term
borrowing and more cash outflows to investment expenditure and fixed
coverage expenses than companies offering common stock. The classi-
fication and prediction accuracies of the extended model in this
comparison were 75% and 66%, respectively. These results are com-
parable to the performance of the Marsh and BLT models. For the
modified cash flow model, the classification accuracy was 67% and the
prediction accuracy was 66%. /
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The results of the pairwise comparison of straight debt to conver-
tible bonds offerings, that utilize the extended model, are found in
Table 10. The significant variables are the SIZE, NOF*, AFINE*, DIV*
AND ASTB* variables. All except the NOF* variable had the expected
signs. The positive coefficient estimate of the NOF* variable implies
that companies offering convertible bonds have a larger share of their
cash inflows generated internally than those offering straight debt.
Table 11 shows the results of the modified cash flow model are similar
to the straight debt-common stock offerings comparison, except that
the AFINE* variable was not significant. The accuracy of the classi-
fication and prediction tests of the extended model were 89% and 82%,
respectively. For the modified cash flow model, the accuracy of the
corresponding tests were 78% and 73%. The results of the probit
analysis were markedly better than the BLT model.
The findings in the convertible bond-common stock offerings com-
parison were markedly different from the preceding pairwise com-
parisons. There were only two significant variables in Tables 10 and
11, the AFINE* and ASTB* variables. The AFINE* variable had the same
sign as the other analyses, but the ASTB* variable had the opposite
sign. The test indicates that companies offering common stock had
larger proportion of their cash inflows coming from short term
borrowing than those offering convertible bonds. The same findings
were observed for both the extended and modified cash flow models. In
addition, many of the variables in the analysis, though not signifi-
cant, had signs that were opposite to the other analyses. This
observation is different from those in the BLT study which found that
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corapanies offering convertible bonds behaved in between those offering
straight debt and common stock. The classification and prediction
performance results associated with the cash flow variables were not
promising. Like the results in the combined test, the cash flow model
failed to classify or predict companies offering convertible bond
correctly. Given the findings in the Duncan's Multiple Range test, it
is not a surprise to observe that companies offering convertible bonds
have a lot in common with companies offering common stock.
In addition, except the pair-wise probit analysis on the con-
vertible bond-common stock offerings, the chi square test statistics
of the probit analysis were significant at the 1% level for both the
extended and modified cash flow models. These findings indicate that
cash flow components are important in explaining the type of security
offered by corporate issuers.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
The financial information used in prior studies to interpret and
explain the informational signalling and optimal capital structure
hypotheses on security offering decisions of publicly-held companies
provided the motivation to use relative cash flow components to
predict the type of security issued in an offering. Given that the
companies decide to seek external financing, the study found the
relative cash flow components provide significant information in
classifying and predicting the security type to be offered. The
results in this study confirm prior empirical studies that were based
on rate of return data. That is, the informational signalling
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hypothesis is strongly supported, but the optimal capital structure
hypothesis is not substantiated by the cash flow information. In
summary, when compared to companies offering straight debt, companies
offering equity securities have a smaller and decreasing portion of
their sources of cash inflows generated from operations, but a larger
and increasing portion coming from external equity financing. In
addition, they have smaller and decreasing shares of their cash
outflows going to capital investment and dividend payments. An
anchor of this study is that the financial health, of companies
offering equity securities is worse than the health of companies
offering straight debt. Additionally, companies that offer equity
securities are experiencing a deterioration in their financial health.
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FOOTNOTES
See Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Eckbo
(1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), and Mikkelson and Partch (1986,
1988).
2
The other hypotheses include the implied changes in cash flow
hypothsis, the optimal capital structure hypothesis, the price pressure
hypothesis, the tax leverage hypothesis and the wealth redistribution
hypothesis. These hypotheses also offer interpretations to immediate
stock price reactions to security offering announcements.
3
See Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977), Heinkel (1982), Myers
and Majluf (1984), Krasker (1986), Blazenko (1987) and Narayanan
(1988).
See Gentry, Newbold and Whitford (1985b, 1988, 1990).
For the hypotheses in this paper, it is assumed for the dependent
variable that the most senior securities, straight debt, would be
located close to the intercept on the y axis and the least senior
securities, common stock, would be located at the upper region of the
y axis.
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TABLE 1
AN EXAMPLE OF THE HIERARCHY OF RELATIVE CASH FLOW
COMPONENTS AND RELATIVE FREE CASH FLOW (FCF*)
MEASURES UNDER VARIOUS RISK CONDITIONS
Company
Relative Cash Flow Measures
Net Operating (NOF*)
Net Investment (NIF*)
Dividends (DIV*)
Fixed Coverage Exp. (FCE*)
FCF* Before Working Capital
A Net Working Capital (ANWC*)
FCF* After Working Capital
1
Lowest Highest
Risk Risk
A B C D
100% 75% 50% 25%
-40 "11 -30 -20
60 40 20 5
-10 -15 -20
-_5 -10 -L5 -30
45 15 -15 -25
-10
35% 7%
- 5
-20% -25%
Balancing Components
A Net Financing (ANFFF*)
A Net Other A & L (ANOA&L*)
A Cash (ACash*)
FCF* After All Flows 0% 0% 0% 0%
1
ANWC* = AARF* + AINVF* + AOCA* + AAP* + AOCL*
TABLE 2
PREDICTED SIGNS OF COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR THE TWO HYPOTHESES
Cash Flow Components
Net Operating (NOF*)
Short Terra Financing (ASTB*)
Long Terra Financing (AFIND*)
Equity Financing (AFINE*)
Fixed Coverage Expenditures (FCE*)
Net Investment (NIF*)
Dividend (DIV*)
Other A&L (AOA&L*)
Informational
Signalling
Hypothesis
+
+
+
Optimal
Capital
Structure
Hypothesis
+
+
Other Variables
SIZE
ASCOMP
DEVLTD
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITY OFFERINGS BY SECURITY
TYPE BETWEEN 1977 and 1986
Year Straight Debt Convertible Bonds Common Stocks Total
1977 6 2 8
1978 1 2 1 4
1979 11 3 14
1980 20 8 13 41
1981 9 4 5 18
1982 11 3 7 21
1983 3 3 33 39
1984 3 2 5 10
1985 15 5 18 38
1986 25 10 19 54
NT 104 37 106 247
NI 58 33 73 123
where NT: total number of offerings.
NI: total number of industries represented.
TABLE 4
ANOVA F TEST RESULTS AND DUNCAN'S
MULTIPLE RANGE TEST RESULTS
ANOVA F Straight Debt Convertible Common Stock
Variable Statistics
17.25***
(SD) (80)
*
Bonds (CB) (28)
233.7
(CS) (83)
SIZE 1768.8 520.2
ASCOMP 6.84** 0.45974 * 0.35330 = 0.36060
DEVLTD 0.07 0.02069 s 0.02631 = 0.01714
TCF/TA 1.12
4.88*** 1
0.26691 = 0.29554 = 0.28772
NOF* 0.54327 = 0.47028 = 0.44314
ANFF* 0.43 0.12874 = 0.11533 = 0. 16068
ASTB* 3.55* 0.04046 * -0.02951 = 0.00213
AFIND* 1.92 0.15798 = 0.13206 = 0.07309
AFINE* 6.71** -0.02924 = -0.01671 * 0.08759
FCE* 0.30 -0. 11345 = -0.10197 = -0. 11444
NIF* 3.51* -0.40530 = -0.33696 = -0.31378
DIV* 8.68*** -0.09230 * -0.05127 = -0.06240
ANOA&L* 0.34 -0.01161 = 0.00654 = 0.00869
AARF* 0.01 -0.07684 = -0.08264 = -0.07750
AINVF* 0.17 -0.07524 = -0.08926 = -0.06711
AOCAF* 0.02 -0.02068 = -0.02312 = -0.02068
AAPF* 0.24 0.04852 = 0.06535 = 0.05398
AOCLF* 1.06 0.05771 = 0.04407 = 0.03464
1
NOF*s for straight debt sample and common stock sample are signif-
icantly different from one another at the 5% level.
***signif icant at the 0.01 level
**signif icant at the 0.05 level
*signif icant at the 0. 10 level
TABLE 5
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR CFC* AND OTHER VARIABLES
FOR TIME PERIOD t-1, 4 YEAR AVERAGE AND DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE TWO MEANS FOR COMPANIES THAT ISSUED
STRAIGHT DEBT (ORIGINAL SAMPLE; n = 80)
SIZE
ASCOMP
DEVLTD
TCF/TA
NOF*
ANOA&L*
ANFF*
AFIND*
AFINE*
FCE*
NIF*
DIV*
ACash*
AARF*
AINVF*
AOCAF*
AAPF*
ASTB*
AOCLF*
t--1 4 Year
Mean
Average
S.D.
Differe
Mean
nee
Mean S.D. S.D.
1768.77 2123.07 — — — —
0.4597 0.1972 — — — —
0.0207 0.0953 — — — —
0.2669 0. 1057 0.2517 0.0792 0.0152 0.1014
0.5433 0.2136 0.5825 0. 1524 -0.0392** 0.1758
-0.0116 0. 1588 0.0167 0.0553 -0.0283 0. 1642
0. 1287 0.2315 0.0562 0. 1573 0.0725** 0.2827
0. 1580 0.2359 0.0603 0. 1153 0.0977*** 0.2852
-0.0293 0.1845 -0.0040 0.0996 -0.0253 0.1916
-0.1135 0.0792 -0.1055 0.0554 -0.0079 0.0583
-0.4053 0.2064 -0.3752 0. 1725 -0.0301 0. 1870
-0.0923 0.0594 -0.1006 0.0585 0.0083** 0.0366
0.0172 0. 1419 -0.0363 0.0729 0.0535*** 0. 1796
-0.0768 0. 1335 -0.0682 0.0709 -0.0087 0. 1425
-0.0752 0. 1322 -0.0439 0.0927 -0.0313** 0. 1424
-0.0207 0.0549 -0.0075 0.0357 -0.0132* 0.0667
0.0485 0.0923 0.0422 0.0451 0.0063 0. 1094
0.0405 0. 1167 0.0066 0.0378 0.0338** 0. 1336
0.0577 0.0762 0.0397 0.0522 0.0180* 0.0936
***signif icant at the 0.01 level
**signif icant at the 0.05 level
*signif icant at the 0.10 level
TABLE 6
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR CFC* AND OTHER VARIABLES
FOR TIME PERIOD t-1 , 4 YEAR AVERAGE AND DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE TWO MEANS FOR COMPANIES THAT ISSUED
CONVERTIBLE BONDS (ORIGINAL SAMPLE; n = 28)
t- 1 4 Year
Mean
Average
S.D.
Diff
Mean
erence
Mean S.D. S.D.
SIZE 233.73 242.17 — —
—
— —
ASCOMP 0.3533 0.2180 — — — —
DEVLTD 0.0263 0.1217 — — — —
TCF/TA 0.2955 0.0960 0.2747 0.0893 0.0208 0.0772
NOF* 0.4703 0. 1484 0.4893 0.1925 -0.0190 0.1627
ANOA&L* 0.0065 0.1133 -0.0066 0.0644 0.0132 0.1307
ANFF* 0.1153 0.3096 0. 1086 0.2160 0.0067 0.2995
AFIND* 0. 1321 0.2807 0.0908 0. 1648 0.0412 0.3221
AFINE* -0.0167 0.2296 0.0178 0. 1278 -0.0345 0.1851
FCE* -0. 1020 0.0619 -0. 1112 0.0603 0.0092 0.0616
NIF* -0.3370 0.2379 -0.3045 0. 1818 -0.0325 0. 1689
DIV* -0.0513 0.0382 -0.0521 0.0381 0.0009 0.0196
ACash* -0.0164 0.1714 -0.0290 0.0810 0.0126 0.1918
AARF* -0.0826 0. 1894 -0.0840 0.1145 0.0013 0.1899
AINVF* -0.0893 0.2202 -0.0838 0. 1275 -0.0055 0.2298
AOCAF* -0.0231 0.0766 -0.0093 0.0158 -0.0138 0.0785
AAPF* 0.0654 0.0913 0.0414 0.0519 0.0240 0.0815
ASTB* -0.0295 0. 1157 -0.0024 0.0867 -0.0271 0.1620
AOCLF* 0.0441 0. 1258 0.0412 0.0481 0.0029 0.1141
***signif icant at the 0.01 level
**signif icant at the 0.05 level
^significant at the 0. 10 level
TABLE 7
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR CFC* AND OTHER VARIABLES
FOR TIME PERIOD t-1, 4 YEAR AVERAGE AND DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE TWO MEANS FOR COMPANIES THAT ISSUED
COMMON STOCKS (ORIGINAL SAMPLE; n = 83)
t-1 4 Year
Mean
Average
S.D.
Differe
Mean
nee
Mean S.D. S.D.
SIZE 520.24 1068.23 — — — —
ASCOMP 0.3606 0. 1629 — — — —
DEVLTD 0.0171 0. 1228 — — — —
TCF/TA 0.2873 0. 1077 0.2632 0.2632 0.0240* 0. 1127
NOF* 0.4431 0.2179 0.5300 0. 1479 -0.0869*** 0.251
ANOA&L* 0.0087 0. 1815 -0.0002 0.0531 0.0089 0. 1993
ANFF* 0. 1607 0.2922 0.0879 0. 1618 0.0727** 0.3383
AF1ND* 0.0731 0.3163 0.0635 0. 1338 0.0096 0.3738
AFINE* 0.0876 0.2322 0.0245 0. 1006 0.0631** 0.2532
FCE* -0. 1144 0.0768 -0. 1180 0.0648 0.0035 0.0669
NIF* -0.3138 0.2352 -0.3099 0. 1408 -0.0039 0.2182
DIV* -0.0624 0.0550 -0.0752 0.0603 0.0128*** 0.044
ACash* -0.0452 0.2076 -0.0291 0.0633 -0.0161 0.2245
AARF* -0.0775 0.1738 -0.0803 0.0834 0.0028 0. 1889
AINVF* -0.0671 0.2007 -0.0974 0. 1062 0.0303 0.2046
AOCAF* -0.0207 0.0505 -0.00635 0.0214 -0.0143** 0.0513
AAPF* 0.0540 0. 1297 0.04672 0.0545 0.0073 0. 1412
ASTB* 0.0021 0. 1463 0.0116 0.0669 -0.0095 0. 1848
AOCLF* 0.0346 0. 1128 0.0518 0.0490 -0.0171 0. 1229
***signif icant at the 0.01 level
**signif icant at the 0.05 level
*significant at the 0. 10 level
TABLE 8
PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR TEST INCLUDING CASH FLOW
COMPONENTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL VARIABLES
Name Coefficient
Intercept
SIZE
ASCOMP
DEVLTD
TCF/TA
NOF*
ASTB*
AFIND*
AFINE*
FCE*
NIF*
DIV*
ANOA&L*
AARF*
AINVF*
AOCAF*
AAPF
1.2056*
-0.0003***
-1.7640**
0.7312
0.5553
0.8430
-0.7216
0.4385
2.2822***
-0.1503
0.6098
4.0414*
1.7738**
1.2448
1.1830
1.0396
0.3590
R
en X
60.67***
40.96%
-162.22
Classification and Prediction Accuracy
Security Sample Classification
Type Size
80
n (%)
SD 63 (79%)
CB 28 (0%)
CS 83 60 (72%)
Total 191 123 (64%)
Security Sample Prediction
Type Size n (%)
SD 24 19 (79%)
CB 9 (0%)
CS 23 14 (61%)
Total 56 33 (59%)
***signif icant at the 0.01 level
**signif icant at the 0.05 level
*signif icant at the 0. 10 level
TABLE 9
PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR TEST INCLUDING
CASH FLOW COMPONENTS
Name Coefficient
Intercept 1.4489**
TCF/TA -0.2954
NOF* 0.4236
ASTB* -1.5376*
AFIND* 0.8041
AFINE* 1.8979***
FCE* 2.0201
NIF* 1.9311***
DIV* 5.7548***
ANOA&L* 1.9556**
AARF* 1.0260
AINVF* 0.7178
AOCAF* 0.1185
AAPF* 0.3119
xl 39.36***
R 26.80%
en X -172.88
Classification Prediction Accuracy
Sample
Security Size
Typ e _ _*
SD
CB
CS
Total
80
28
83
191
Sample
Size
n
Security
Typ e
SD 24
CB 9
CS 23
Total 56
Classification
Accuracy
n (%)
59 (74%)
(0%)
53 (64%)
112 (59%)
Prediction
Accuracy
n (%)
18 (75%)
(0%)
11 (48%)
29 (52%)
***signif icant at the 0.01 level
**signif icant at the 0.05 level
*signif icant at the 0.10 level
TABLE 10
PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR PAIRWISE TESTS USING
THE EXTENDED MODEL
Coefficients
SD & CS SD & CB CB & CS
Intercept 2.0011** 0.0676 0. 1647
Size -0.0002** -0.0029*** 0. 0009
ASCOMP -2.4835** -3.3529 -0. 8984
DEVLTD 0.8778 0.4580 1. 1833
TCF/TA -0.3465 4.2032 -0. 1109
NOF* 0.9055 4.8789** -0. 2488
ASTB* -1.5689 -7.6492** 2. 8217*
AFIND* 0.6053 0.6762 -0. 0339
AFINE* 2.5010*** 3.0613* 2. 3799**
FCE* 1.2570 1.4164 -3. 2843
NIF* 0.9288 0.4607 -0. 1474
DIV* 5.2491** 9.7768* -4. 3103
ANOA&L* 2.2388** 2.8306 0. 8210
AARF* 1.7704 2.6914 0. 1836
AINVF* 1.7200* 1.2042 0. 7542
AOCAF* 1.2032 -0.1670 0. 2157
AAPF* 0.7324 -1.9585 0. 6073
2 57.26*** 71. 12*** 13. 34
49.68% 97.03% 52. 37%
dn X -84.32 -26.24 -53. 52
Classification and Preidiction Acxuracy
Sample Classification
Security Size SD & CS SD 6. CB CI5 & CS
Type n n
59
(%)
(74%)
n
74
(%)
(93%)
n (%)
SD 80 __
CB 28 - 22 (79%) 4 (14%)
CS 83 63 (76%) — 78 (94%)
Total 191
Sample
L22 (75%) 96 (89%) 82 (74%)
Security Size Prediction
Type n n
19
(%)
(79%)
n
23
(%)
(96%)
n (%)
SD 24 __
CS 9 - 4 (44%) 1 (11%)
CB 23 12 (52%) — 23 (100%)
Total 56 31 (66%) 27 (82%) 24 (75%)
***signif icant at the 0.01 level
**signif icant at the 0.05 level
*significant at the 0. 10 level
TABLE 11
PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR PAIRWISE TESTS USING
THE MODIFIED CASH FLOW MODEL
Coefficients
SD & CS SD & CB CB & CS
Intercept 1.8699** 1.4804 0.0243
TCF/TA -1.1118 -0.0403 0.4156
NOF* 0.5005 1.3603 -0.2491
ASTB* -2.3557** -6.3247*** 3.2580**
AFIND* 1.1803 0.9063 -0.0224
AFINE* 2.1612** 1.0262 2.0156**
FCE* 3.4612* 7.1116** -3.8156
NIF* 2.5019*** 2.7238** 0.3690
DIV* 6.4449** 13.2768*** -5.7323
ANOA&L* 2.2858** 2.6458* 0.2556
AARF* 0.9361 1.7563 0.0764
AINVF* 1.0032 0.3065 0.7433
AOCAF* -1.0713 -0.7309 -0.4339
AAPF* 0.2871 1.3645 0.5355
2
R
x
>
37.81*** 34.74*** 14.56
34.07% 49.96% 24.37%
en \ -94.05 -44.43 -55.41
Classification and Prediction Accuracy
Sample Class:.f ication
Security Size SD & CS SD & CB CB & CS
Type n n
55
(%)
(69%)
n
72
(%)
(90%)
n (%)
SD 80 __
CB 28 — 12 (43%) 4 (14%)
CS 83 54 (6 5%) — 80 (96%)
Total 191
Sample
109 (67%) 84 (78%) 84 (76%)
Security Size Prediction
Type n n
18
(%)
(75%)
n
20
(%)
(83%)
n (%)
SD 24
CS 9 — 3 (33%) 1 (11%)
CB 23 13 (57%) -- 22 (96%)
Total 56 31 (66%) 23 (73%) 23 (72%)
***signif icant at the 0.01 level
**signif icant at the 0.05 level
*signif icant at the 0.10 level



